Tuesday, October 21, 2014

The Begin Filmatography

Did you know Begin has a filmatography listing?

Biographical movies
Begin (1998)

Portrayed in
Sadat (1983) (TV)
Raid on Entebbe (1976) (TV)

Magazine cover photo
Time (USA) 20 September 1982
Time (USA) 11 September 1978
Time (USA) 30 May 1977

And there's one in the works.



Maybe you'd like to assist?


Trailer:



The Revolt Sizzle Reel from The Revolt - The Movie on Vimeo.

^

Monday, September 22, 2014

Why Jews Deserve a State


Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin never loosened his tie, nor did his mind stray from the horror of the Holocaust, where Jewish ash would convince the world that Jews deserved land of their own. 

that was a description in the new Camp David book.

Menachem Begin believed that the Jewish people deserved a homeland so as to avoid that ash the first time because it was the natural right of the Jews to reconstitute the ancient homeland.  That was his conviction, even of no anti-Semitism even existed.

^

Thursday, September 18, 2014

Reviewing a Book Review


NYT Book Review Provides Platform for Joe Klein's Bias

Few topics arouse the ire of Time Magazine's political columnist Joe Klein more than Israeli or American Jewish conservatives or traditionalists. When he writes about them, historicity and facts become secondary to his own personal animus.

Such is the case with the journalist's book review of Lawrence Wright's “Thirteen Days in September,” published in the Sept. 14, 2014 New York Times Sunday Book Review supplement. Mr. Klein uses his review of a book about the 1978 Camp David negotiations as an opportunity to vent his own hostility against former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who was a major player in the negotiations and resulting accords, as well as a traditionalist and a conservative.

It is informative to contrast Klein's review of the book in the New York Times with one in the Wall Street Journal two days earlier by Elliot Abrams, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former senior director for Near East Affairs at the National Security Council. According to Abrams:
In Mr. Wright's version, Mr. Carter and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat come across far better than Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who is presented mostly as an obstacle to peace....Begin's life story is told far less sympathetically than are those of Mr. Carter and Sadat... [He] is presented as "the man who embodied the most wounded and aggressive qualities in the Israeli psyche. Obstruction, not leadership, was his nature. (Wall Street Journal, Sept. 12, 2014)
Klein, on the other hand, sees the author's somewhat negative characterization of Begin as “almost sympathetic.” He writes:
It is a measure of Wright's fairness and subtlety that Begin comes across as an almost-sympathetic character.
Klein himself characterizes Begin as a clearly unsympathetic character. “He isn't dashing; he isn't eloquent; he doesn't smile,” writes Klein, who brands him a “sourpuss extremist.”

As to Begin's approach to his religion, Klein is similarly denigrating:
His Judaism was litigious, drawn from the Talmudic tradition of worrying the law to distraction, fighting over every codicil.
The book reviewer is certainly entitled to his own negative opinion of Begin, and even to his misinformed characterization of Talmudic tradition. But it is his double standards in categorizing terrorism and terrorists that are most disturbing.

As leader of the Irgun (Etzel), an armed underground organization in Mandate Palestine that encouraged illegal immigration and carried out attacks against the British, Menachem Begin was labeled a terrorist by the British and competing Zionist groups. That designation, as well as the manner and type of attacks that Etzel carried out, has been and continues to be debated.

There is far less debate about the infamous 1978 PLO-perpetrated slaughter that came to be known as the “Coastal Road Massacre.” That attack killed 38 Israeli civilians, including 13 children, and wounded 71 others. Time Magazine called it “the worst terrorist attack in Israel's history.”

But while Klein categorically labels Begin “a former terrorist,” he refrains from using that term to characterize the Palestinian perpetrators of the 1978 massacre. He blandly calls them “militants.”

Their intention, as two surviving terrorists confessed, was to seize hostages at a luxury hotel, as well as to take UN representatives and international ambassadors hostages who could be exchanged for Palestinian prisoners in Israel, but that plan was aborted after the boats carrying the terrorists landed 40 miles away from their destination. Instead, the terrorists hijacked a bus, shot and threw grenades at passing cars, and eventually tried to kill the passengers on the bus and others who crossed their path. The timing of the attack was meant to destroy the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiation and to damage tourism, according to a Fatah planner

None of these motives, however, serve to blame Israel, and so Klein insidiously attributes a different intention to the terrorists– one turns the story away from Palestinian terrorism to an indictment of Israel under Menachem Begin's leadership. He writes:
The massacre was intended as a provocation; a disproportionate Israeli response was assumed. And three days later, Israel invaded southern Lebanon, which was then controlled by the Palestine Liberation Organization led by Yasir Arafat. “Those who killed Jews in our times cannot enjoy impunity,” the Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin said. More than a thousand Palestinian civilians were killed; more than 100,000 were left homeless. The world, including President Jimmy Carter, was horrified. Following another invasion in 1982, Israel would occupy parts of southern Lebanon until May 2000.

It is hard to trust a book review about historical characters that is imbued with so much apparent personal hostility that the "facts" are shaped to support the reviewer's feelings. It is not surprising, however, that the New York Times entrusted such a review to Joe Klein, who would reliably bash Israel.

_________

If you read the article, you will catch this sentence of Klein
Begin didn’t cave on anything except giving up the Sinai Peninsula
as if that meant nothing.

And this is important:

When Carter proposed that Israel allow a Jordanian flag to fly over the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, Begin responded, “Never. . . . What will happen when the Messiah comes?” He agreed to participate in the negotiations because “President Carter knows the Bible by heart, so he knows to whom this land by right belongs.”
^

Thursday, September 11, 2014

The 13 Days of September 1978

New book is out on the Camp David Conference.

From a review:

The agreement Carter brokered between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin was the crowning achievement of his otherwise disappointing presidency. Sadat and Begin later were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. But Wright's book is no paean to the leaders.
Instead, he casts a critical and honest eye upon the three men.

Much of "Thirteen Days" details the fractured personal and public histories that brought Carter, Begin and Sadat to power and eventually to Camp David. And it portrays the negotiations themselves as a tense series of meetings between powerful men who whined, pouted and screamed to get their way...

...Sadat had helped set a peace process in motion with a surprise visit to Jerusalem in 1977. By agreeing to Carter's Camp David gambit, he hoped that Egypt might displace Israel as the Americans' key ally in the region. Begin was convinced the talks would fail — he was the only one of the three leaders to arrive at the summit without any proposals...

...As a condition for recognizing Israel, Sadat demanded that Begin return the Sinai Peninsula. Begin said such a deal would mean giving away a buffer zone of deserts and mountains in exchange for a mere written promise. Given Begin's own experiences with loss and betrayal, it was a difficult bargain to make.  "There was only one thing standing in the way, and that was Begin's entire history," Wright says.

and there is this:

On the surface, Begin and Sadat had little in common. But earlier in their careers both had been prisoners of the British colonial authorities. Both had fought — often viciously — for the independence of their countries. Wright doesn't spare showing us the blood they had on their hands.

As a young Egyptian nationalist during World War II, Sadat joined a "murder society" that assassinated isolated British soldiers and later targeted Egyptian leaders who collaborated with British colonial authorities.

Begin was a Zionist from a young age. In 1929, he joined a paramilitary Jewish youth group in Poland. He lost most of his family in the Holocaust. In Palestine, he became among the fiercest of the rebels fighting the British for the creation of a Jewish state. He used tactics that would later come to be branded "terrorism."

"The transformation of terrorism as a primarily local phenomenon into a global one came about in large part because of the success of his tactics," Wright writes of Begin. "He proved that, under the right circumstances, terror works."

Of course, Sadat saw Hitler as an idol; Begin didn't.

^

Thursday, September 4, 2014

When They Called Begin "Murderer"

I moved to Israel from New York in 1982, during another summer of fighting, and Israeli society was tearing itself apart. The Palestinian Liberation Organization was firing Katyusha rockets into residential areas of the Galilee; the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) had invaded Lebanon, in Israel's first asymmetrical war against terrorists in urban neighborhoods. As civilian casualties in Beirut mounted, Israelis raged at each other in the streets. On Rosh Hashanah, I saw then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin emerge from a Jerusalem synagogue, to be greeted by left-wing demonstrators shouting, "Murderer!"


Yossi Klein Halevi
New Republic, August 29, 2014

^

Saturday, May 10, 2014

Against Begin Then, And Netanyahu Now

From Dan Margalit:-

Digging in his heels
Former Director-General of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission Brig. Gen. (ret.) Uzi Eilam's interview with Dr. Ronen Bergman in Yedioth Ahronoth raised two claims: the first that former Prime Minister Menachem Begin erred when he ordered the bombing of the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq 33 years ago, and the second that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is "using the Iranian threat to score political points."

While heading the Atomic Energy Commission, Eilam had opposed bombing the Iraqi reactor. It was the height of the 1981 election campaign and Begin, who feared he would lose the elections, quoted Hillel to Eilam, saying, "If I am not for myself, who is for me?" -- meaning that a Shimon Peres-led government would not bomb the reactor. Peres, on his part, was vocal about his objections to the operation.

In the decades that have passed, it has become clear that the 1981 strike was a great strategic achievement. A decade on, it stopped Saddam Hussein in his tracks when he threatened to invade Persian Gulf states and possibly Saudi Arabia. Years later, Ehud Barak asked a senior American official if the United States would have gone to war against a nuclear Iraq, and was told that would have been unlikely.

With the exception of Peres and Eilam, every Israeli Jew has lauded Begin for ordering the strike. It is impossible that the two are oblivious to how crucial the strike was, especially knowing what Hussein did to restore his nuclear capabilities. Why is it then, that this distinguished defense official is unable to simply admit he was wrong? If you cannot do so when you are 80, when can you?Eilam's argument about Netanyahu is equally puzzling...

^

Tuesday, April 29, 2014

Another Review of the Gordis Begin Biography

From David Isaac's review of the Daniel Gordis Begin biography:

...The one subject where Gordis fails to depart from the conventional wisdom, and as a result comes up short, is the treaty with Egypt. Today, there exists an almost universal belief that this was Begin’s greatest achievement. While Gordis avoids waxing lyrical about the treaty, he does not analyze its glaring failings. As Moshe Sharon, who was Begin’s adviser on Arab affairs and took part in the Egypt-Israel negotiations, put it recently, “The peace with Egypt is nothing more than a prolonged armistice with ambassadors.”

Gordis writes of the contrast that President Jimmy Carter and his administration made between Sadat the visionary and Begin the pettifogging legalist. But he fails to point out that, ironically, it was Begin who was the true visionary, determined to create friendly and normal relationships between Israel and Egypt. He was anxious to dot every “i” and cross every “t” to make sure the new era of relations would have a firm legal foundation. Gordis omits all reference to the 50 detailed agreements Egypt signed on everything from joint agricultural research to cultural programs and exchanges, agreements Begin saw as the nuts and bolts of the new era of relations he believed he was establishing.

Sadat had a simple goal: Get back the Sinai “to the last grain of sand.” He did not need to worry about legalistic details because he had no intention of transforming relations. Those 50 agreements (outside of eight, which were published in the 1980s), gather dust in the archives of the Israeli foreign office. Central to Begin was ending the “teaching of contempt.” The promise “to abstain from hostile propaganda” was put into the text of the peace treaty itself. Yet Egypt continued to be a hotbed for inciting hatred for Israel and Jews.

Gordis does point out Carter’s cluelessness about what made Begin tick. “His public protestation of Christian piety notwithstanding, Carter had none of the biblical sensibilities or knowledge that were central to who Begin was,” Gordis says. This ignorance continues today. Kerry blames Israel for the failure in negotiations without any idea of Jewish history, of the difficulties Israel faces, and of the nature of the enmity against it, rooted in Islam and the absolute refusal to accept a Jewish state in the heart of the Islamic world...