Reviewing Begin's Decision to Bomb Iraq's Nuclear Facility

...despite the myriad risks, the Israeli cabinet decided to attack.

Why? Above all, because its leaders truly believed that the nuclear program was an imminent existential threat. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin would continue saying, until his last days, that in those years he experienced nightmares of Jewish children dying in a second nuclear holocaust -- one that it was his duty to prevent. And the "Begin doctrine" that he created -- that Israel will not tolerate weapons of mass destruction in the hands of an enemy state -- is alive and well today.

What many international observers dismiss as alarmism was a very real factor in the mind of Begin, a Holocaust survivor who lost both his parents to the war. The same echoing trauma and sense of historical duty is ubiquitous among Israel's top leadership. And it is apparently the prism through which Benjamin Netanyahu sees the world: "It's 1938, and Iran is Germany," the current Israeli prime minister told a conference in 2006. "[Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad] is preparing another Holocaust for the Jewish state."

Nor was the attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility an isolated event. In 2007, Israel again decided to strike a nuclear reactor in defiance of its strongest ally. In the preceding year, U.S. and Israeli intelligence assets had discovered a covert Syrian plutonium reactor being built with North Korean assistance. For long months after its detection, Israel and the United States had intimately cooperated on how to handle its removal. It was only when President George W. Bush told Prime Minister Ehud Olmert that the United States had decided to take the matter to the United Nations, rather than strike itself -- or agree to let Israel strike -- that Jerusalem decided to act, even against an explicit American objection.

In both the Syrian and Iraqi cases, the Israeli government exhausted all other options before resorting to a military strike. Begin launched a sabotage campaign against Iraq's nuclear program in 1979 after his cabinet decided that diplomacy had run its course. Iraqi scientists were assassinated, French technicians were threatened, and containers holding key parts of the reactor were blown up on their way to Iraq. But in January 1981, an internal intelligence committee ruled that sabotage was no longer "sufficient in delaying the program," which lead to the ultimate decision to strike. In 2007, Olmert negotiated with the Americans in the hope that they would do the dirty work for him, and he only directed his military to strike after Bush turned him down.

Nothing indicates that Netanyahu's thinking is any more dovish than that of Begin or Olmert. The Israeli premier is keenly aware of history and knows how small and short-lived the costs to Israel were in the past. He also knows that Israel was later greatly appreciated for the decisive actions it took, that the Israeli Jewish population takes the perceived threat from Iran seriously, and that the "Begin doctrine" is lauded domestically to this day. In an Oct. 15 Knesset speech marking the 40th anniversary of the 1973 war, he said, "There are cases when the thought about the international reaction to a preemptive strike is not equal to taking a strategic hit."

- Uri Sadot
Foreign Policy

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1981 / 2012; Begin / Netanyahu

From a report in Israel Hayom:

Three decades ago, an Israeli prime minister faced his Cabinet and invoked the Holocaust in an emotional appeal to approve an air strike against an Arab atomic reactor.  Menachem Begin got the nod, cautioning that a nuclear-armed Iraq under Saddam Hussein would pose a threat to the existence of the Jewish state. On June 7, 1981, Israeli warplanes destroyed the nuclear facility near Baghdad.

The current prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, would also need ministerial backing, from his 15-member Security Cabinet, should he seek to attack Iran, despite Washington’s warnings of the risks to the global economy and U.S. regional interests...

...In 1981, Begin kept both the Knesset plenum and a key parliamentary security panel in the dark about the planned F-16 sneak attack, explaining later that he could not trust lawmakers not to leak details to the media.


The air force chief at the time, David Ivry, said the mission was approved by the Security Cabinet and then the full Cabinet, with all present being asked to sign secrecy contracts.

“First came the approval in principle, and then the detailed discussions and briefings,” Ivry told Reuters.

A briefing paper presented to Begin’s Cabinet ministers by Israeli military intelligence cautioned that Washington might respond to an attack against Iraq by clamping an arms embargo on Israel, according to “Tammuz in Flames,” a 1993 book on the operation by Israeli journalist Shlomo Nakdimon, whose manuscript was reviewed by close Begin aides.

But with just one holdout, and over opposition by Israel’s Mossad spy chief, the ministers voted in favor of the attack, which destroyed the French-built reactor without the loss of a single Israeli plane.

“The memory of the Holocaust in which six million Jews perished remained before [Begin’s] eyes throughout all the discussions,” Moshe Nissim, a Cabinet minister at the time, wrote in his own book about the strike.

“He underscored the fact that this action was saving thousands of Israeli children from the claws of the Butcher of Baghdad,” Nissim wrote.

Israel’s official statement on the 1981 air raid spoke of the need to eliminate “an existential threat to the people of Israel,” language echoed by Netanyahu, who has said the Holocaust has taught the Jewish state it must not shy from acting alone to thwart any danger to its survival...

To cast the net of consensus further, Netanyahu would almost certainly convene Israel’s centrist opposition leader, Tzipi Livni, to notify her of his plans and ask for her support.


Learning of plans for the strike against Iraq’s reactor, Shimon Peres, Labor opposition leader at the time and now Israeli president, cautioned Begin that Israel would be isolated internationally, “like a thistle in the desert,” if the attack went ahead.

As opposition leader in 2007, Likud party chief Netanyahu was reportedly consulted about the Syria strike by then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. Though Netanyahu lacks chemistry with Livni, as a former Cabinet minister and Mossad spy she would not be viewed as a leak risk.

Three decades ago, Begin took no such chances.

Israeli warplanes were already on their way to Iraq when Begin, who also served as defense minister, summoned his Cabinet to his Jerusalem residence. Although the ministers had approved the operation, they had agreed that only Begin, his foreign minister and top generals would decide when to launch the raid.

“Shalom, my friends,” Begin told them, according to Nakdimon’s account. “At this moment, our planes are approaching Baghdad and the first one will be over the atomic reactor shortly.”

Begin, Iraq and Iran

From an op-ed by Yoram Ettinger in Israel Hayom:-

...In June 1981, just before the destruction of the nuclear reactor in Iraq, then Prime Minister Menachem Begin weighed the cost of a pre-emptive strike versus the cost of inaction. The heads of the Mossad and military intelligence, then Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, opposition leader Shimon Peres, Deputy Prime Minister Yigael Yadin, Israel's national security adviser and the head of the Atomic Energy Commission all opposed striking Iraq. They presented apocalyptic scenarios that would result from such action: an irreparable rift with the U.S., harsh sanctions, conflict with the Soviet Union and Western Europe, reconciliation between Muslim countries and a pan-Islamic attack, threats to the peace treaty with Egypt and other doomsday events. They underestimated the success of a pre-emptive attack and glorified Iraq's military capabilities. Some claimed there was a greater chance of seeing Israeli pilots being dragged through the streets of Baghdad than being welcomed back to their bases.

But Begin decided in favor of a pre-emptive strike, ultimately determining that the cost of restraint could be greater than that of a pre-emptive strike; that a nuclear threat would enslave Israel both politically and militarily; that a nuclear attack could not be ruled out considering the violent, unexpected nature of regimes in the region, and that the ratio of Israeli territory to that of surrounding Arab states (0.2%) did not allow for a nuclear threat balance. Begin understood that the window of opportunity for a strike against Iraq's nuclear reactor was about to close. The destruction of the reactor drew a wave of virulent criticism even from avowed Israel supporters, but it was later followed by a sea of admiration and long-term collaboration.

In 2012, after a decade of failed attempts at dialogue and sanctions, and in light of the help (in terms of development and acquisition) Iran has received from Pakistan, North Korea, Russia and China for its nuclear program, Israel must decide between launching a pre-emptive attack to eliminate that threat or withstanding it. Opponents of an attack warn that it could potentially result in a harsh response from Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas, international anger directed at Israel over higher oil prices, or a wave of terror and conflict in the Persian Gulf. Yet these pale in comparison to the deadly cost of a nuclear threat, which include a withdrawal of Israeli and foreign investment in the country, a greater number of Israelis leaving and fewer immigrants coming to Israel, dwindling tourism, greater military-political-economic dependence on the U.S. and a more powerful and influential Iranian regime that takes control of the Persian Gulf. Israel's position as a strategic asset would be reversed without even one nuclear warhead needing to be launched.

The cost of a pre-emptive attack against Iran would be non-lethal and short-term, and would boost Israel's long-term strategic image. It would also provide a tailwind for the forces opposing the ayatollahs' regime. Will Israel adopt the legacy of Ben-Gurion and Begin, or that of their opponents?

　

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Begin's Senses

Reported:

The United States had no warning of the attack on the Osirak reactor ordered by Menachem Begin, the Israeli Prime Minister, in June 1981 amid fears that Saddam Hussein was trying to build a nuclear weapon.

Files released by the National Archives show that Britain's ambassador to Washington, Sir Nicholas Henderson, was with US Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger as the news came in.

"Weinberger says that he thinks Begin must have taken leave of his senses. He is much disturbed by the Israeli reaction and possible consequences," Sir Nicholas cabled London.

Britain's ambassador in Baghdad, Sir Stephen Egerton, disclosed that the Iraqis had been just as surprised when the Israeli F15 fighters appeared in their skies.

"The diplomatic corps had a ringside view of the belated ack-ack and missile reactions to the raid when we were gathered for the Italian national day reception on the Bund [waterside]," he wrote.

And a second report:

When news broke that Israeli fighters, flying at dusk from a Negev airbase and crossing Jordanian and Saudi air space, had destroyed Iraq's Osirak reactor, the perceived nuclear threat from Saddam Hussein appeared to have been lifted.

But confidential documents, just released by the National Archive, show that the attack, in June 1981, brought an angry response not just from Saddam but from many of Israel's firmest friends - including the Americans.

US Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger reportedly said: "[Menachem] Begin must have lost control of his senses."

This less-than-diplomatic outburst was overheard by a British embassy official who passed it on to the Foreign Office, where a similar view was taking hold.

The Israeli raid, by F15 and F16 jets, on Iraq's French-supplied nuclear facility, followed intelligence reports that the reactor was on the point of producing weapons-grade nuclear material - despite Iraqi protests that it was developing nuclear power for peaceful purposes.

"I will not be the man in whose time there will be a second Holocaust," Prime Minister Begin had told his military chiefs.

An eye-witness report on the raid came from the UK's ambassador in Baghdad, Sir Stephen Egerton.

In a "secret" cable to Whitehall he described how "at 18.34 local time, enemy aircraft, later shown to be Israeli, bombed the Osirak reactor.

"They flew in low at dusk from the Western Desert, and to avoid the enormous earthworks surrounding the reactor, they climbed sharply and then precision-bombed their target." World reaction to the operation - codenamed Operation Opera - was a mix of shock and dismay, the documents revealed. Despite some comments that displayed thinly-veiled respect for the audacity of the Israeli pilots, even Israel's traditional friends were furious.

After much debate, the US voted in favour of a UN Security Council motion condemning Israel's actions and it also delayed the delivery of a consignment of jet fighters to the IAF. This followed successful diplomatic efforts by the West to persuade the Iraqis and their Arab allies not to push ahead with a resolution demanding tough economic sanctions against Israel.

"Clearly, it would be right to avoid sanctions," said a Foreign Office official in a report to Britain's prime minister, Margaret Thatcher.

This was essential, he added, if America was to support the resolution - something that would have "real impact on Israel".

One staffer at the British UN mission, in a message to Downing Street, said that America's UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick was under particularly heavy pressure "from the Zionist lobby". The official added: "I know this for a fact. She has bared her soul to me."

Known for her sterling support of Israel, Mrs Thatcher was also urged by lobbyists to understand Israel's actions. She dismissed their arguments as "unsupported".

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Another Appreciation of Begin

Yoel Marcus writes in "Palestinians than to play the hero against Iran":

When in June 1981 the Israel Air Force bombed the nuclear reactor under construction in Iraq, opinions about the operation were divided. This writer thought that Menachem Begin, the prime minister and defense minister at the time, was at his best. Others considered it a mistake because Iraq would neither forgive nor forget, and at the first opportunity would bomb Israel. This “opportunity” really did present itself 10 years later, when the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait led to Operation Desert Storm, led by the United States and its allies. Iraq launched 39 Scud missiles at Israel.



When then-Defense Minister Moshe Arens cleared the air force to prepare for an attack on Iraq, Shas leader Aryeh Deri traveled on Shabbat to convince him that this intervention would be disastrous for us. With all due respect to Shas, it was Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir who canceled the operation, when the U.S. administration warned him that Israeli intervention was liable to make Syria and Egypt bolt from the coalition against Iraq.

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More On The Iraqi Bombing

Letter responding to Richard Allen's piece:

June 11, 2010

An Earlier Israeli Raid, When Reagan Was President

To the Editor:

While “Reagan’s Secure Line,” by Richard V. Allen (Op-Ed, June 7), presents an interesting and useful insight into President Ronald Reagan’s attitude toward the Israeli air raid in June 1981 that destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq, it calls for several comments.

First, Mr. Allen said that the raid “dealt a fatal blow to Saddam Hussein’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon.” This was not the case at all; it drove the Iraqi program underground, causing Iraq to enhance and conceal its nuclear weapon program.
Indeed, Shimon Peres, who was then opposition leader and is now Israel’s president, was critical of the strike then and for years afterward for just this reason. After the first Persian Gulf war, it was determined that the Iraqi regime was perhaps only two years away from a nuclear weapon.

Second, Mr. Allen notes that Secretary of State Alexander Haig, against his inclination, authorized “criticism” of Israel as a result of pressure from inside the bureaucracy of the State Department and from other countries. But the United States did more than simply criticize Israel; it joined in a unanimous Security Council resolution that condemned Israel, calling its actions a violation of the United Nations Charter and the norms of international conduct. President Reagan was the head of the United States government when this happened.

This event ultimately did not disturb United States-Israeli relations, and given the nature of the Iraqi regime, Israel’s actions may well have been justified by history. Nevertheless, what was involved was a significant military assault on the territory of a sovereign state on the one hand, and on the other hand, the real possibility of nuclear weapons in the hands of Saddam Hussein.

Thus, the 1981 event should not be suggested as a precedent in either direction for the current incidents related to the blockade of Gaza.

Thomas Graham Jr.
McLean, Va., June 8, 2010

The writer is a former special representative of President Clinton for arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament, 1994-97.

The Bombing Of Iraq's Reactor Recalled

In the London Times, an excerpt:

An Israeli colleague was sent on an assignment so secret and sensitive that it was years before he would share the full story with friends.

He was dispatched by Menachem Begin, then the Prime Minister, to European capitals with orders to meet editors, politicians and opinion makers to spread the word that Israel was increasingly concerned about Iraq's nuclear programme and would do anything to stop Saddam Hussein building the bomb. The warnings, intended to prepare Western public opinion, were largely dismissed as sabre-rattling (one editor insisted on discussing a new lavatory system designed on a kibbutz) - until June 1981, when Israeli Air Force F16s bombed the plant to rubble.

A few days ago a chill went down my spine when an articulate and intelligent senior Israeli official made exactly the same argument about Iran's nuclear programme at a briefing in London. He described an Iranian nuclear weapon as an existential threat to the Jewish state, which would defend itself whatever the consequences. These warnings are not new but the political and military circumstances are conspiring to make an Israeli attack on Iran a probability, unless the Middle East experiences dramatic changes in the coming weeks and months.

It is a widely held conclusion among nuclear experts that Iran now possesses enough enriched uranium to build a nuclear bomb. It would still have to be enriched to weapons grade at the centre in Natanz before being made into a warhead. But Iran has mastered the technology and has the raw materials. Building a nuclear bomb is now only a matter of time...

Reaction to the Iraqi Reactor Bombing

On June 11, 1981 Schlesinger lunched with the prominent journalist Joe Alsop. The topic was "the sneak Israeli attack on the nuclear installation in Iraq, an appalling action" in Schlesinger's view; but he recorded that Bill Paley, president of CBS, and Alsop, the Wall Street Journal and even Schlesinger friend's the liberal journalist Jim Wechsler applauded the attack. When Kissinger was asked his view at a dinner party, he said, "Privately, I am pleased. I think many Arabs are pleased."

Source

Jan 15, 2008
Revelations of an inquisitive historian
By SHIMSHON ARAD

From the Archives

The above is a telegram sent to Prime Minister and the Defense Minister Menachem Begin by then Major (Res.) Dan Halutz and Captain (Res.) Y'hoav Gal on May 18, 1981.

It reads:

"1. With you all the way.

2.Expecting vigorous responses against the hot-headed attempts of the Maarach (the coalition of socialist parties: Labor, Ahdut HaAvoda) to spread dissension amongst the people.

3. It need be made clear to Shimon Peres that his words [negating the operation] are causing hesitation and doubt regarding the justness of our way also amongst those in the army.

4. As part of the fighter manpower that are scheduled to carry out your decisions we stand behind you without limit."

The bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor took place on June 7.