"Israel Must Be Handled With Great Caution"

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We must re-examine peace treaty with Israel - Egyptian Judge

Alexandria, Asharq Al-Awsat – Judge Mahmoud al-Khudairi is the former vice president of the Egyptian Cassation Court. He is also a newly-elected member of the People’s Assembly, having won the seat of the Sidi Gabir district, Alexandria, in the latest round of the Egyptian parliamentary elections.

In an interview with Asharq al-Awsat, conducted from the city of Alexandria, al-Khudairi spoke

...[Asharq al-Awsat] How do you envision relations with Israel in the post-revolution phase?

[Al-Khudairi] Let’s talk frankly in this regard. Israel must be handled with great caution, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty must be re-examined, especially in relation to the reconstruction of Sinai, which is yet to be completed in full. The agreement cannot prevent any state from freely
carrying out reconstruction projects on its own territory. However, this does not mean that the current treaty recognizes this, for there is much ambiguity regarding the terms of the treaty and its specific appendices. Thus, we must raise the question of the treaty in its entirety, and present it before parliament to re-examine and re-define its terms.

[Asharq al-Awsat] What is the first question or request for information that you plan to submit in the forthcoming parliament, and to whom?

[Al-Khudairi] There are two requests I intend to submit to the Egyptian Foreign Minister. The first is to disclose the agreement under which gas is exported to Israel, which I deem to be illegal or unconstitutional, because it is squandering the country’s natural resources, which are the right of the Egyptian people. As for my second briefing request, this will refer to the continued blockade of Gaza, and Egypt’s international role in lifting this blockade, as the situation in Gaza can be considered an extension of
Egyptian national security...

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Retrospect on The Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty

From:

Into the Fray: Begin – in retrospect
By MARTIN SHERMAN

Israel cannot afford the same miscalculations made in the peace treaty with Egypt on its fronts with the Palestinians and the Syrians.

The road to hell is paved with good intentions – Aphorism attributed to Saint Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153)

We cannot conclude from the good intentions of a statesman that his foreign policies will be either morally praiseworthy or politically successful....How often have statesmen been motivated by the desire to improve the world, and ended by making it worse? And how often have they sought one goal, and ended by achieving something they neither expected nor desired? – Hans Morgenthau (1904-1980), on political realism

The sweeping victory of the Islamist parties in the election in Egypt is – somewhat belatedly – beginning to concentrate minds. Israel is being forced to confront the stark possibility that in the foreseeable future, it may be left with no peace, no Sinai... and eventually, no demilitarization.

Inevitably, this unpalatable prospect will force a national reassessment of the process – and the personalities – that brought this ominous situation about, of the prudence of the decisions taken at the time and of the beforethe- fact predictability of its potentially perilous outcome.

Inevitably, too, this will focus attention on Menachem Begin and his role in precipitating Israel’s evacuation of the strategic expanses of the Sinai Peninsula in return for a peace treaty with Egypt, then Israel’s principle adversary.

A brief history
The deal, brokered by US president Jimmy Carter, was concluded in 1979 after two years of intense negotiation following Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s historic 1977 address to the Knesset. It was greeted with great international acclaim – except in the Arab world where it was long regarded as an act of treachery – and the award of Nobel peace prizes to the Egyptian and Israeli leaders.

The intended strategic substance of pact was mutual recognition of each state by the other, and the cessation of the state of war that had existed since the 1948 War of Independence.

Israel undertook a complete withdrawal from Sinai, held by it since the 1967 Six Day War, while Egypt agreed to the demilitarization of the peninsula. The agreement also provided for the free passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal, recognition of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba as international waterways, and massive US economic and military to Egypt, whose military has since received almost $40 billion from Washington, allowing it to to modernize and revamp its aging Soviet equipment.

Stark asymmetry
Whichever way you slice it, the treaty was afflicted by a stark structural asymmetry in the undertakings of the contracting parties: On the one hand, Israel was called on to relinquish vast physical assets of great strategic and economic value, which could only be retrieved – if at all – by a massive outlay of blood and treasure.

In return for the receipt of these assets – plus generous US financial support – all that was demanded of Egypt was paper promises, which could be violated whenever it deemed it expedient or the profit worth the pain.




This asymmetry was perhaps most aptly articulated by Sadat himself, when in a 1980 interview with The New York Times, he remarked bluntly, “Poor Menachem... I got back... the Sinai and the Alma oil fields, and what has Menachem got? A piece of paper.”

From the outset then, the durability of the peace agreement hinged not only on Cairo’s continuing willingness to honor its commitments, but also its continuing ability to do – despite domestic opposition. This clearly applies – and applied then – not only to the Sadat regime, but to any successors who might accede to power – be it by the bullet or by the ballot.

Predictable perils
There is – and was – no need for the benefit of hindsight to grasp this pivotal feature of the agreement. It was distinctly discernible as an inherent element of the treaty from the get-go. It was always a precarious arrangement — its abrogation, whether sudden or in stages, always a plausible possibility.

Indeed, it would seem that Sadat himself was keenly conscious of the fragility of the treaty and how future Egyptian regimes may well feel unbound by its terms. In a 1975 interview he openly stated: “The effort of our generation is to return to the 1967 borders.

Afterward the next generation will carry the responsibility.”

Yet within the Israeli public discourse, any suggestion that the potential long-term strategic dangers might outweigh the undeniable short/intermediate-term benefits, were dismissed as the demented raving of extremist warmongers. Anyone who dared caution that the situation now emerging in Egypt and along our southern border, might in fact emerge, was scorned either as a deranged scaremonger or a uniformed ignoramus.

Consequently, there was no serious public discussion of how to respond to an intentional violation of the agreement, or an unintentional collapse of Cairo’s ability to uphold it. And in the absence of a clear and credible comprehension of what penalties such violations would incur, only a giant leap of faith in Arab altruism could induce the belief that these scenarios were implausible.

However, beyond the mindless malice and myopia of political debate in Israel, questions must be raised as to the judgment and foresight of the Israeli leadership that consented to forgo the tangible fruits of military victory for the ephemeral promise of political peace.

As Begin was the overwhelmingly dominant figure involved in Israel’s acquiescence to the treaty terms, it is likely such a reevaluation would, as an unintended side effect, damage his standing in the national pantheon.

‘The road to hell...’
The objective would be to enhance awareness of the non-static nature of Israel’s political environment, and to develop deeper understanding of how the nation should manage long-term risk in the dynamic instabilities of the Middle East. But more specifically – and more important – it is imperative to avoid creating similar situations of strategic danger through similar strategic misunderstandings of the dynamics in play on Israel’s other fronts with the Palestinians, the Syrians and the Jordanians.

There can, of course, be no doubt as to the totality of Begin’s commitment to Israel and to its security, or as to fever of his devotion to Zionism and its ideals. Indeed for many, he was the epitome of the leader whose absolute dedication to his country and his people was never subordinated to, or sidetracked by, the pursuit of partisan interest, private gain or personal prestige.

However, pure motives and noble intentions are no guarantee of effective statesmanship or strategic acumen.

Indeed, as Hans Morgenthau, one of the most influential figures in the study of modern international politics, remarked: “Chamberlain’s politics of appeasement were, as far as we can judge, inspired by good motives; he was probably less motivated by considerations of personal power than were many other British prime ministers, and he sought to preserve peace and to assure the happiness of all concerned. Yet his policies helped to make the Second World War inevitable, and to bring untold miseries to millions.”

While any comparison between the two men is wildly inappropriate, the bloodcurdling frenzy of the lynch mob that stormed the Israeli Embassy in Cairo in September may prove that Begin’s declaration of “No more war, no more bloodshed, peace forever” was no less premature and naïve than Neville Chamberlain’s “Peace in our time.”...

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The Egyptian-Israel Peace Treaty

Results from arecent opinion poll conducted by Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies

By Abdel Monem Said
Al Arabiya News
Monday, 24 October 2011

4% favour recourse to war for various reasons
7% for abolishing the peace treaty
12% for expelling the Israeli ambassador from Cairo
11% for recalling the Egyptian ambassador from Israel

62% would like to see the peace agreement to continue, but with amendments intended to enhance Egyptian security (and which are currently being reviewed).

23% want the peace treaty to remain exactly as it is for fear of renewed tension and conflict at a time when Egypt needs to rebuild itself amidst a host of other formidable challenges.

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Camp David Accords In the News

In a Washington Post article on Egypt post-Tahrir Square, New Egypt foreign minister likely to be tougher on Israel, we found this:

Egypt on Sunday got its second new government in less than six weeks, including a new foreign minister who is expected to take a tougher line with Israel than the government of the ousted president Hosni Mubarak did...

In one of the most significant shifts, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, Egypt's foreign minister since 2004, was replaced by Nabil Elaraby, a career diplomat who won plaudits from demonstrators for joining the crowds in Cairo's Tahrir Square shortly before Mubarak resigned. He was subsequently appointed to the council of "wise men" named by the demonstrators to help steer the country's path to democracy.

As a member of the team that negotiated the Camp David peace treaty with Israel in 1978, he can be expected to abide by all of Egypt's existing commitments to Israel, analysts and former colleagues said. But he is renowned for having voiced reservations about some of the treaty's clauses to then-President Anwar Sadat, and "will not be willing to accept Israeli excesses in the occupied territories," said Mustapha Kamel al-Sayyid, a professor of political science at Cairo University.

"Public opinion in Egypt is in favor of a less soft approach to Israel and I think he shares this feeling," he added. "It will be very difficult for him to make the kind of concessions Hosni Mubarak made to Israel," such as during the 2009 Gaza war, when Egypt closed its border with Gaza.

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Egypt Today, Egypt Then

The Winnipeg Free Press relates to the current Egyptian situation by recalling 30 years ago:

Israel rethinking its defence

For the first time since its 1979 peace treaty with Egypt, Israel finds itself politically besieged.

When Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat signed their peace treaty in Washington on March 26, 1979, the regional political landscape was totally different.

Turkey was Israel's strategic ally, and the Khomeini Revolution was busy establishing its Islamic institutions in Iran. Lebanon's Hezbollah was non-existent, as was Hamas.

Now, Syria and Hezbollah are establishing themselves as the dominant forces in Lebanon; Jordan risks becoming the next target of the "Facebook Revolution"; Hamas is holding firm in the Gaza Strip and challenging the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

Even if the peace treaty with Egypt is not abrogated, Israel has to take into consideration the possible rise in power and influence of Muslim Brotherhood in the Nile Valley. This dramatic change in the political landscape forces Israel to re-examine its defence doctrine, that is still based -- to a large extent -- on the peace with Egypt.

Despite the excellence of its intelligence services and technological superiority, Israel was caught off-guard. The reason? Israel was focused mainly on security and strategy and less on domestic issues -- like unemployment, poverty and corruption and their impact on the regime's stability.

Israel, for example, didn't understand that for many Egyptian students, their university degree was no more than a membership card in the "club of the unemployed."

Therefore, when the demonstrations hit the Cairo streets last Tuesday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was among only three regional leaders who called President Hosni Mubarak and expressed hope that he would overcome the crisis.

The other two were Saudi King Abdullah and the Emir of Kuwait.

...Under Mubarak, Egypt kept the Sinai desert semi-demilitarized. It sealed the Gaza Strip in an effort to prevent smuggling of arms and terrorists in support of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. It also played an important role in the struggle against Iran's nuclear ambitions.

This situation enabled Israel to reduce its military budget from 23 per cent of GNP in 1979, to 11 per cent today. A change in Egyptian military doctrine would force Israel to increase its military budget, at the expense of vital social services. Israel would also be forced to mobilize more troops to protect its Egyptian border.

What is even more serious -- a new Egyptian regime with enhanced Muslim influence potentially could lead to war with Israel in the future and could encourage Hamas in Gaza, the West Bank and Jordan...

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A Note on Begin's Peace Negotiations

From an article by Yoel Marcus:-

...the Camp David conference that generated the framework agreement for peace between Israel and Egypt also began in September (1978 ). It set out to deal with the core of the conflict between us and Egypt and draft a framework agreement for a peace treaty.

Menachem Begin came with a written list of 13 expressions that were not, under any circumstances, to appear in the peace agreement. They all pertained to the Palestinians and included "the just, legitimate rights of the Palestinian people," "all aspects of the problem," "the inadmissibility of seizing territories by force" etc. etc.

After 13 days of discussion, Begin agreed to include all the "forbidden" terms in the treaty. The White House mediators, headed by President Carter, presented 23 different drafts for framework agreements, one of which had all the forbidden expressions in it, masterfully disguised with verbal special effects. Anwar Sadat withdrew his demand to establish a Palestinian state and the Palestinian problem was swept under the carpet.

- - -

Yehuda Avner on the Egypt-Israel Peace Process

Essay: With undue credit

Mar. 19, 2009
Yehuda Avner , THE JERUSALEM POST

This month marks the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. It was a protracted and teetering process, beginning with the staggering visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat who was bidden forth by the deft diplomacy of prime minister Menachem Begin.

Never had Ben-Gurion Airport been more embossed and festooned as on that Saturday night of his arrival - a sea of light and of color, hung with a hundred flapping flags, Israeli and Egyptian. Deep rows of parading troops, their regimental ensigns aloft, framed the tarmac, and at one end was arraigned a military band, its brass instruments flashing in the floodlights.

Sadat's schedule was hectic. It lasted 36 hours, capped by an address to the Knesset. And as his plane faded into the sky back to Cairo an exuberant prime minister beckoned me over to say, "I want to send off a cable to president Jimmy Carter straight away to tell him how it went," and on the spot he began to dictate while striding to his car.

As anyone who has ever tried it knows, writing while walking is no easy feat, and my resultant scribble was so illegible I had tremendous difficulty deciphering it. Once I did, it came out like this: "Dear Mr. President - Yesterday night president Sadat and I sat till after midnight. We are going to avert another war in the Middle East, and we made practical arrangements to achieve that quest. I will give you the details in a written report. The exchanges were very confidential, very far-reaching from his point of view. I am very tired. I work 20 hours a day. There are differences of opinion. We are going to discuss them. I have a request. You will plan another trip to various parts of the world. Please visit both Egypt and Israel during that trip. Sadat was very moved by the reception of our people. You will come to Israel and we will give you a wonderful time. So will Egypt. Give two days to Jerusalem and Cairo. Please take this into consideration."

THAT SAME NIGHT the prime minister, exhausted though he was, received a four-man delegation of United Jewish Appeal philanthropists (now the United Jewish Communities) who had flown in from the US especially to witness the historic event. Among them was an old acquaintance from Columbus, Ohio - Gordon Zacks, commonly known as Gordie.

Gordie was a close-thatched, vigorous, enterprising, big-hearted, idealistic sort who not only gave generously but also thought innovatively. In 1975 he'd embarked on a peacemaking mission of his own by flying to Egypt to identify a hundred projects in the fields of medicine, agriculture, irrigation, industry and social welfare, which he envisioned as possible joint Egyptian-Israeli enterprises to serve as stepping stones to peace. He carried his proposal to Israel and asked me to arrange a meeting with the then prime minister Yitzhak Rabin.

As Rabin flicked through the bulky project folder, Gordie leaned across and said to him with enormous zest, "Yitzhak, listen to me, this is a no-lose deal."

"Meaning what, exactly?" asked Rabin, slamming the folder shut without even pretending to examine a single one of its projects.

"Meaning, here is a way of testing Sadat's true intentions toward peace."

"Gordie, in what world are you living?" scorned Rabin with pitiless sarcasm, pushing the folder away as if its author was one of the babes in the wood.

"I'm telling you this is a solid proposal," countered Gordie indignantly. "Israel could offer to become a part of any or of all these projects. It could lay the foundations for confidence-building measures, the beginnings of a dialogue."

"And if the Egyptians say we don't want you, as I'm sure they will?"

"Then what you do is to publicly offer them two projects a week for 50 weeks. You will come out smelling like roses as the peacemaker, while Sadat will seem to be the intransigent one."

"Crazy, naive American," scoffed Rabin, rising and extending a hand of farewell. "Gordie, old friend, this is just another public relations gimmick. Go back home to America and do what you do best: raise money for the United Jewish Appeal."

And off Gordie went, dejected.

TWO YEARS LATER, when Menachem Begin assumed the premiership, he asked to see all materials to do with Israel's past peacemaking efforts with Egypt, and among the documents was Gordie's proposal. It aroused enough curiosity for the premier to ask me who the man was, and when I told him, he said, "His ideas are a fantasy, but they show daring and imagination. I'd like to meet him one day." I phoned this through to Gordie and within a week he was having lunch with the prime minister in the Olive Room at the King David Hotel.

"Mr. Zacks, have you ever been in jail?" asked Begin while the first course was being served.

"No, Mr. Prime Minister," answered Gordie testily, wondering what Begin was getting at. "I've never been in jail."

"That's a pity," said Begin enigmatically, nibbling on his chicken. "You see, I have been in three different jails."

Gordie Zacks sat back, stunned: "Three - how come?"

"The first time the communists arrested me was in Vilna. I was in the middle of a game of chess. When the Soviet agents dragged me off, I remember calling out to my colleague, 'I concede the game. You win.' The Soviets locked me up in one of their prisons. I was held there for six weeks, and all I could think of was getting out and going back home, free. The second prison was a forced labor camp in Siberia. By the sixth week, I dreamed of being back in that first prison cell. The third time the Soviets put me in solitary confinement, and I dreamed of being back in that Siberian labor camp. So, you see, Mr. Zacks, my job as prime minister of Israel is to make sure that Jewish children dream the dreams of a free people, and never about prisons, or labor camps or solitary confinement. I want to bring them peace, but in our region peace can be won only through strength."

"So, how can I help?" asked Gordie, with his characteristic wholeheartedness."

"By telling me about your trip to Egypt, and the nature of the projects we might do together with the Egyptians once we have peace."

IT WAS NO WONDER, therefore, that Gordie Zacks displayed such excitement that night at the end of Sadat's visit when Begin told him and his colleagues, "Friends, you will be pleased to hear that president Sadat and I have come to an understanding. We still have our differences as you heard in his Knesset speech and my response to him, but we agreed there will be no more war. I already wrote as much to president Carter. Yehuda" - this to me - "did you sent off my cable?"

"Of course, as soon as I got back to Jerusalem from Ben-Gurion."

"Then, let's call the president now - hear his reaction."

"Do you have his number?" I asked.

Begin shook his head with an air of innocent ignorance.

"So, I'd better rush over to the office. I have it in the classified phone file," I said.

"Why not call the international exchange and ask for the White House switchboard," suggested Gordie helpfully. "I'm pretty sure they have a general number."

"I'll try," said I, and soon enough I got through to 001 202 456 1414. I was speaking in the hallway to a woman at the White House switchboard who thought I was a crank.

"I'm sorry, mister," she said in a steely voice, "but you can't speak to the president of the United States."

"It's not me, it's the prime minister of Israel, Mr. Menachem Begin," I said haughtily.

To which she responded dubiously, "Menakem who?"

"Begin."

"Hold the line."

"Hello, how can I help you?" - this from a lady in a more mellifluous voice.
I explained the matter and she said reasonably, "Please give me the prime minister's number and we'll get back to you."

I checked the phone to see the number. There was none. How could there be? This was the prime minister's residence, and his number was not for public display for prying eyes to see. So I called out to the prime minister sitting in the lounge, "Mr. Begin, what's your number?"

"I've no idea. I never phone myself," he said.

And then, moving into the hallway he shouted up the stairwell, "Alla [that's how he called his wife, Aliza], what's our phone number?" "664763," she shouted back.

I scribbled it down and repeated it to Washington.

"Thank you," said the voice, "we'll get back to you presently."

And, sure enough, within minutes, the phone rang, and the voice said, "Please put the prime minister on the line. I'm putting the president through now."

I handed over the receiver, and stood aside to take notes. With no extension close to hand I could only record what Begin was saying.

"I HOPE YOU received my message, Mr. President," he said beamingly.

Long pause: "Of course, tomorrow I shall send you a full account, through our ambassador."

Another long pause: "Oh yes, indeed," said Begin with an enthusiastic shake of the head. "There are immediate concrete results from the visit. President Sadat and I agreed to continue our dialogue on two levels, the political and the military. Such meetings will take place hopefully between our representatives soon. We made a solemn pledge at our joint press conference in Jerusalem that there will be no more wars between us. This is a great moral victory. And we agreed that there be no future mobilizations or troop movements on either side, so that our mutual commitment of 'no more war' may be given a practical expression on the ground."

And then, shoulders back, head rising, forehead frowning: "No, no, Mr. President, I assure you - yes, yes - we still want to go to a Geneva peace conference if you still think that will be useful. It is all a matter of the proper timing. President Sadat and I discussed this, but we did not talk about an actual date. We exchanged ideas on the most substantial issues, and knowing we have differences of opinion we promised each other to discuss them further in the future. What is important is that the atmosphere throughout all our talks was friendly, frank and cordial."

Then finally, face all a-grin and voice bubbling: "Mr. President, without you it could never have happened. So allow me to express my deepest gratitude for your magnificent contribution. Peace-loving people the world over - and the Jewish people for generations to come - will be forever in your debt for the role you played in helping to bring this historic visit about. We shall need your understanding and help in the future. God bless you, Mr. President. Good-by," and he hung up.

Privy to every word, his guests in the lounge fervently congratulated him on what was, assuredly, an affable conversation - all of them, that is, but Gordie Zacks who asked dumbfounded, "Why, Mr. Prime Minister? Why? Why give Jimmy Carter so much credit? Sadat came here because of what you did, and despite what Carter did with his idea of a Geneva international peace conference."

"What does it cost?" answered Begin with a pixyish expression. "I'm still going to need America, aren't I? So giving him a bit of credit now might help us a little bit in the future. The important thing is that Sadat and I are agreed on making peace with or without Geneva."

And, indeed, they did. No Geneva conference was ever convened. Had it done so it would have simply added gratuitous knots to what was just the same a knotty endeavor.
President Obama, please note.

The writer was on the personal staff of five prime ministers. His book The Premiers (Toby Press) will appear at the end of the year.

avner28@netvision.net.il

Newly Declassified Documents

Carter administration wanted Egypt liason role in Gaza

Mar. 25, 2009
Etgar Lefkovits , THE JERUSALEM POST

The US sought to include a provision for self-government in Gaza and an Egyptian liaison role in the coastal strip as part of the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace accord, newly declassified US documents show.

The cache of documents, which were declassified last year, were attained from the Carter Library by a researcher from the Begin Center in Jerusalem as Israel and Egypt mark 30 years since the peace treaty between the two nations was signed.

The documents, which include drafts and notes to the president, reveal that the US administration sought to include movement toward a resolution on the volatile coastal territory, which was run by Egypt between 1948-1967, in the pending agreement between Israel and Egypt.

"A provision for the implementation of self-government in Gaza first is clearly important for Sadat. In our view, this is reasonable in purely practical terms," was written under a "checklist" for Carter's meeting with Begin.

The documents note that Sadat attached "major importance" to an Egyptian liaison role in Gaza, but was prepared to make clear that this was only "for the purposes of facilitating the negotiations for establishing the self-governing authority."

Begin was opposed to any Egyptian liaison role in Gaza, which he believed as part of Israel, and the "dramatic crisis" issue nearly held up the agreement until the Egyptians backed down, said Begin Center Deputy Director Moshe Fuksman.

A draft letter dated March 10, 1979 states that within a month of the peace treaty being signed, negotiations would commence in accordance with the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East."

"The Delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. In the event Jordan decides not to take part in the negotiations, Egypt and Israel will, prior to the elections, agree on the modalities for establishing the self-governing authority, define its powers and responsibilities, and agree upon other related issues," the letter says.

"The two governments agree to negotiate continuously and in good faith to conclude these negotiations as expeditiously as possible. They also agree that the objective of the negotiations is the establishment of the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza in order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants."

However, no such negotiations ever took place after the signing of the March 26, 1979 peace treaty.

A second newly declassified document, dated March 3, 1979 and written by Zbigniew Brzezinski to the president, offers two basic scenarios on reaching an agreement - one positive and one negative - for his upcoming trip to Israel and Egypt.

The document, repeatedly labelled "top secret," concludes with two columns, one marked "positive" and one marked "negative," which referred to the upcoming schedule following the weekend talks with Begin. In the event of an accord, a trip to Egypt was to be announced Monday for the following weekend, followed by a visit to Jerusalem and a trilateral summit. In the event the talks failed, the Egyptian foreign minister was to be summoned to Washington with a trip to the Middle East put off until "a week later or so."

Bernard Lewis on the Peace With Egypt

Recently, it was my pleasure to talk with Professor Lewis [who] told me something about Sadat. I will paraphrase, but pretty faithfully, I think:

“Sadat did not decide to make peace with Israel because he suddenly converted to Zionism. His reason was quite different. He was aware that Egypt was becoming a Soviet colony. I saw that myself, on frequent visits to Egypt. The Soviet presence was palpable — more obtrusive than the British presence, and I’m old enough to remember that. The Soviets were taking over, there were places where no Arab was able to set foot.

“I remember talking with a shopkeeper in Upper Egypt. He said there were no tourists coming anymore, which was, of course, very bad for business. ‘But you have plenty of Russians,’ I said, whereupon he spat into the gutter and replied, ‘They won’t buy a package of cigarettes, and they won’t give you a cigarette.’

“Anyway, the Russians were taking over, and Sadat saw that. He realized that, on the worst estimate of Israel’s intentions, and on the most generous estimate of Israel’s power, they were less dangerous than the Soviets. And the Israelis were not going to take over Egypt, that was clear. That was why Sadat decided to make peace. Fortunately, he found someone on the other side who would respond.

“We are moving to a similar situation now. Many Arabs have concluded, ‘Israel is not our main danger, our main problem.’ If you look at the Hezbollah war, in 2006, Arabs silently hoped that Israel would finish the job, and were very disappointed when they failed to do so. That continues now. Obviously, they don’t come out strongly in support of Israel — they wouldn’t do that. But there is, shall we say, a readiness to accommodate which did not exist in the past.”

Some time ago, Professor Lewis was paid an extraordinary compliment. One of his books was published in Arabic translation (unauthorized). It was published by the Muslim Brotherhood. At the same time, the book was published in Hebrew by the Israeli defense ministry — and, as Professor Lewis says, that is an interesting pairing: the Muslim Brothers and the Israeli defense ministry.

In his preface to the Arabic version, the translator said, “I don’t know who this author is, but one thing about him is clear: He is either a candid friend or an honorable enemy, and in either case is one who has disdained to falsify the truth.”

An extraordinary compliment indeed.

Source

AFP Story on 30 Years Since Camp David Conference

Egypt surveys peace horizon 30 years after Camp David

CAIRO (AFP) — Thirty years after Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David accords, which led to Israel's first peace treaty with an Arab nation, the Egyptian street is divided between forgetfulness and optimism.
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed the accords on September 17, 1978, after secret negotiations supervised by US President Jimmy Carter, leading to the Egypt-Israel peace treaty of 1979.
"The what accords?" "No idea." "Sorry, I don't know the details," are some of the responses on Cairo's streets.
Others refuse even to give an answer when asked about Egypt's relations with Israel.
But while poorer Egyptians are generally unaware of the accords' existence, wealthier classes say a horizon empty of war with Israel is good both for humanity and for business.
The absence of war is paramount, says Hisham Abdel Aziz, a 47-year-old civil servant, because "they made too many people suffer."
The two countries fought five wars in 25 years: the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, the Suez Crisis in 1956, the Six Day War of 1967, the War of Attrition which ended in 1970 and lastly the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
More than 20,000 Egyptian soldiers died in the conflicts.
"I think the accords were a good thing because there are no more wars with Israel," says geographer Amr Osman, 44. "The most important thing is for the country to be at peace, for the economy to evolve and for tourism to develop."
Sadat made an unexpected visit to Jerusalem in 1977 to begin negotiations with Israel, becoming the first Arab leader to make an official visit to Israel and to recognise its existence.
"Sadat is the only Egyptian leader to have understood the American and Israeli mentalities. He was far-sighted. We got back all our land," says 26-year-old engineer Ibrahim al-Adli.
Israel had captured and occupied Egypt's Sinai peninsula during the 1967 war, with Israel returning the land to Egypt in 1982, evacuating its soldiers and settlers alike under the terms of the peace deal.
"Nowadays the Arabs have no sense of direction, no identity. They won't get anything back, with or without war," continues Ibrahim. "The Palestinians have missed their opportunity to get their rights back."
Tareq Khalil, 25, says the accords "haven't done anything. Zero."
"The accords didn't get us back Sinai. It was the wars beforehand," says Ahmed Eissa, 58. "The accords simply opened talks with Israel which were a dead letter."
Despite the peace agreement and the subsequent exchange of embassies, normalisation between the two populations is far away, although business possibilities abound, especially in tourism.
"Egypt welcomes Israeli and Jewish tourists. There's no problem because these are business relations. There's no relationship between peace and business," says a young man who declined to give his name.
Nevertheless, Israel frequently warns its citizens against holidaying in Sinai, because of what it says is the possibility of militant attacks or kidnappings.
Despite ongoing distrust on both sides, peace remains the ultimate end, whatever the means.
"We would not be where we are if the wars had continued. The most important thing is peace, with Israel or whomever else," says 25-year-old driver Hani Salem.

Video Clip from the New Peace Exhibit

Peace Treaty Commemoration on BBC

Go here and see and hear various videos and audios, including that of Menachem Begin on the occasion of the signing of the 1979 Peace Treaty with Egypt on the BBC's "On This Day" section.